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The Public Interest Versus Freedom of
Contract

The Expanding Public Policy Exception to the Terminable At-will Employment Rule
by Ed Northwood
In March, 1975, Dr. Grace Pierce was Director of
MedicaLResearch/Therapeutics for Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corporation in New Jersey and the only medical member
of a team working on the development of loperamide, a
liquid drug treatment for diarrhea. Loperamide, as then
formulated, contained forty times the concentration of
saccharin then permitted by the U.S Food and Drug
Administration in a twelve-ounce soft drink. The company's management pressed the team to begin clinical or
human testing of the formula despite the probability that
a reformulation of the drug was possible within three
months. Adhering to the Hippocratic Oath, the codes of
ethics of her profession, and various state health and
safety regulations, Dr. Pierce refused to submit the drug
for, testing. Subsequently, her employer removed her
from the project, demoted her, wrote a harsh critical
evaluation, and published the action taken. Thereafter,
Dr. Pierce resigned.
Dr. Pierce possessed no employment contract which
specified a fixed duration nor did there exist express promises relating to her professional conduct while in the
employment of Ortho. Hence, Dr. Pierce was an at-will
employee; that is, she could quit when she wanted to, for
whatever reason, and she could be fired whenever her
employer so desired, for whatever reason, according to
the common law of New Jersey and the vast majority of
American jurisdictions.
Notwithstanding the fact that the law was apparently
against her, Dr. Pierce sought a legal remedy. She sued
Ortho, alleging that her termination was induced by the
wrongful acts of her employer. Her claim for various
damages was alternatively based on theories of breach of
contract, denial of a property right to practice her profession, and contractual interference. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
basis of the at-will rule. The New Jersey Appellate Division overturned this ruling, holding that summary judgment was premature in view of the widespread and growing, acceptance of a public policy exception to the at will
rule in many jurisdictions. In a landmark opinion, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held:
that an employee has a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. The
sources of public policy include legislation;
administrative rules, regulations or decisions;
and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a
professional code of ethics may contain an
expression of public policy, Pierce v. Ortho.
PharmaceuticalCorp., 84 N.J. 58, 72 (1980).
However, the court noted that if a plaintiff who alleges
that he or she has such a cause of action fails to point to a
clear expression of public policy supporting his or her
rights, the court could dismiss the claim. Under this latter
criteria, the high court of New Jersey found against Dr.
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Pierce, thus giving her a Pyrrhic victory: on the one hand
her case set a precedent, one she was trying to establish;
on the other, she lost her individual battle and recovered
no damages.
Pierce exemplifies the relatively broad doctrinal reach
of the public policy exception to the terminable at-will
employment common law rule. While this exception has
achieved the.status of a recognized cause of action in only
fourteen juristictions in the United States, the attention it
has been given by legal commentators, legislators, public
interest advocates, and courts that have not yet adopted
the doctrine demonstrates its importance to all those concerned with the private employment relationship. A
preliminary survey of the common law at-will employment rule will aid in understanding the contours of the
public policy exception.
Overview of the Employment At-Will Doctrine: From
the late nineteenth century, the common law rule in
America regarding employment created without
expressed intentions as to duration has been that
employers may dismiss their employees at any time for
good cause, no cause, or any cause. As a corollary, the
employee may leave without notice or cause. Thus, the
courts have abided by a terminable at-will employment
doctrine.
Oddly, this doctrine emerged from a treatise on masterservant relationships by a not-widely-known commentator, H.G. Woods. Although there was only scant authority
for his formulation of the rule, it became universally
adopted. Apparently the doctrine is based on two
presumptions of law: (1) that the sole consideration upon
which the employment relationship is based is work for
.pay; and (2) the formation of the relationship is premised
on notions of freedom of contract and freedom of
enterprise. Thus, the employer may exercise unfettered
his management prerogative with respect to his labor
resource; likewise, an individual worker may avoid involuntary servitude and be totally mobile.
New York provided the precedent-setting case in this
area, Martin v.New York Lji' InsuranceCo., 148 N.Y. 117

(1895). The potential harshness of the application of
Woods' rule was evidenced by the fact that the court
apparently ignored the equities involved in the case. The
plaintiff was a manager of real estate with over ten years
seniority who was found to have no express agreement
covering his employment duration notwithstanding his
customary receipt of an annual salary, payable monthly.
The court cited Wood as governing this situation, offering
no rationale.
Even where an employment contract was involved, but
the termination of which was found not to be capable of
being tested in court, the at-will rule controlled, Parker v.
Borock, 5 N.Y. 2d 156 (1959). The employment termination issue in Parkerwas subordinate to the main holding,
yet the case is oft-cited for the principle that a wrongful
discharge claim is not actionable when a job is terminable
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At-will Employment...
at-will. The plaintiff rhachinist was a member of a union
which had a collective bargaining agreement with the
employer which allowed termination only for good and
sufficient cause. His union chose not to go to arbitration
on his case. In view of this, the court held that the plaintiff
was without a remedy for wrongful discharge likening his
situation to that of an at-will employee.
Exceptions to the Common Law Rule: The vast discretionary power accorded employers and the consequent
opportunity to abuse and to take unfair advantage of,
even manipulate, their at-will employees by the operation
of the common law rule, is readily apparent. For example,
in the case of the medical professional employee who has
no protection from the rule, any disclosure of unethical or
otherwise improper practices of a colleague, hospital or
employer could result in numerous forms of retaliation
such as the constructive firing in Pierce, outright discharge, or other negative effects on the employment conditions.
Needless to say, since such activities are possible and
exipt, they operate as ever-present dampeners of an
employee's arguable rights to free expression and imperil
the fulfillment of an employee's duty to abide by professional codes of conduct and otherwise act in the public
interest. It is not surprising, therefore, that the twentieth
century has witnessed an erosion in the teminable at-will
employment doctrine. Such erosion has been facilitated
by means of legislative action, collective bargaining, and
development of common law exceptions to this doctrine.
As will be noted, not all of the developments have been
actualized; that is, commentators have not completely
persuaded courts and legislatures of the appropriateness,
legitimacy and value of their proposals. But since the
evolution of this area is rapid, many proposals and arguments not yet a part of the law will be cataloged below,
along with the existing exceptions of law, so as to present
a survey and preview of this field in the early 1980's.
Fundamental concern of at-will employees is that they
may be unprotected against unjust discipline. Needless to
say, the concern disappears where there exists an employment contract which, although not.likely to designate a
specific duration for employment, will require by its terms
that discharge may only occur where there exists just
cause or good and sufficient cause. Such cause, of course,
would not be one motivated by retaliation for a legal or
ethical or otherwise protected act of the employee or by
malice. This condition need not even be express; a large
body of arbitration rulings indicates that employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements do have
extensive protection against abuses of the employment
relationship. These protections include applying just
cause principles, requiring employers to justify their
actions in full and fair hearings, and voiding disciplinary
measures which do not comply with the employer's standard policies.
Thus, it is obvious that one way to prevent abuses of
the at-will rule is to make every employment relationship
one of contract, as by means of collective bargaining
agreements. What is also obvious is that this solution is
unrealistic. Many employment relationships do not lend
themselves to the structuring-associated with unions. Pri-

page eight

vate professionals in particular have shown little inclination to organize (perhaps partly due to the adverse public
reaction to such movements). Moreover, a general inertia
working against unionization seems formidable. Only
22% of all American employees are unionized despite a
period of strong support for union organization. In view of
the fact that approximately 601% to 65% are at-will
employees, collective bargaining agreements will not supply the answer to policy questions at issue.
Legislation can protect an at-will employee from
abusive discharge in two ways. First, a legislature may, in
effect, prescribe the contractual terms which are deemed
part of every applicable employment relationship. For
example, the termination conditions may be defined by
statute as in 5 U.S.C § 7501 which governs federal civil
service employees.
Secondly, a legislature may expressly proscribe certain
employer actions regarding at-will employee relations.
This device-has been utilized in numerous situations relative to employee discipline, usually on the basis of either
employee attributes or employee actions against which
retaliatory measures may not be taken. For example, the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 prohibits discharges
in retaliation for union organization activity; Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discharges which
either discriminate on the basis of sex, race, creed or
nationality or relate to participation in the enforcement of
the Act; § 239 of the Labor Law of New York State essentially prohibits discriminaton on the basis of race, creed,
color, national origin, age or sex in performing public
work contracts; the Consumer Credit Protection Act
prohibits discharge of those whose wages are garnished
for indebtedness; the Fair Labor Standards Act makes
illegal a retaliatory discharge of one exercising rights
under the Act; the Occupational Health and Safety Act
likewise prohibits the discharge of those exercising rights
under the Act; many states prohibit retaliatory discharge
for the filing of workmen's compensation claims; some
states prohibit employer discipline for political activity;
and recently Congress protected federal whistle blowers
by banning reprisals for such activity.
With this background of legislation which erodes the
common law employmnent at-will doctrine several commentators have called for a statute which would protect
at-will employees from abusive or retaliatory discharge.
Were legislation embodying the substance of the proposal
adopted, a common law solution would be mooted.
However, as Blades, among others, has noted:
general statutory limitations on the employer's
right of discharge are unlikely to be enacted so
long as there is no strong lobby to promote
them.. . The unlikihood that such legislation
will be enacted in the foreseeable future is
enhanced by the strong interest groups to be
counted on to oppose it. 67 Col. L. Rev. 1404,
1434 (1967).
Even narrow proposals would be likely to encounter
organized opposition since they would diminish employer
rights (which would threaten all employers), possibly
erode or shift the powers of existing professional
organizations, such as the AMA or AHA, and possibly
conflict with rules relative to client confidentiality.
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Where there exists a governmental nexus in the
employment relationship, the U.S. Constitution may provide protection against unjust dismissal. Civil rights
causes of action for infringement of First Amendment
freedoms have succeeded in protecting certains public
employees. See, for example, Evrod v. Burns 427 U.S. 347
(1976), Per,

i'. Sondermann 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

Frequently; however, employment relations' abuses
occur in circumstances when there is no "State Action"
and these aggrieved employees would have no standing to
sue on a First Amendment claim. Nevertheless, First
Amendment considerations are valuable in that they may
provide additional policy support for persuading courts
that disclosure in the public interest (as in informing the
public of unhealthy or unsafe products or practices, or
fraudeulent or corrupt activities) deserves legal protection. Such observations gain credibility in view of the
recent doctrinal development of the "right to know";
summarized by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring
opinion in First National Bank qf Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 806-7 (1978), which invalidated a Massachusetts
statute forbidding certain types of corporate political
pamphleteering as violative of the First and Fourteentli
Amendments:
One of the (First Amendment's) functions,
often referred to as the right to hear or receive
information, is to protect the interchange of
ideas. Any communication of ideas.

. .

it can

be argued, furthers the purposes of the First
Amendment.
In view-of the limitations of the above means of protecting an employee who is discharged or otherwise disciplined for acting in the public interest, great importance
must be placed on the developing public policy judicial
exception to the terminable at-will rule. Pierce represents
the pinnacle of that development with regard to medical
professionals. So that the Pierce principles and those
closely related to it may be fully understood and so that
chances for their expansion and adoption in other
jurisdictions be appraised, a survey of this doctrinal
development be appropriate.
Perhaps the seminal case in this area is Petermann v.
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344 P2d 25 (1959). The plaintiff had been a business
agent in the employ of a union who instructed him to
.commit perjury in a legislative hearing. When Pertermann testified truthfully he was fired. The court
acknowledged the existence of the terminable at-will rule
but countered:
It would be obnoxious to the interest of the
state and contrary to public policy and sound
morality to allow an employer to discharge any
employee, whether the employment be for a
designated or unspecific duration, on the
ground that the employee declined to commit
perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute.
Consequently, despite the absence of an express statutory
prohibition of discharge on such grounds and the viability
of the traditional rule, the court held that Petermann had
a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge. This holding, at a minimum, stands for the rule that one who
refuses to engage in illegal conduct at his employer's
request, and is discharged for that reason, may seek legal
redress.
Subsequent to Petermann many jurisdictions have
adopted some form of the public policy exception' . In
some instances this cause of action has been grounded in
contract wherein an implied duty to discharge in good
faith and/or for good cause has been read into the
employment relationship. In other "l5ublic policy"
jurisdictions the recovery is based on the tort of wrongful/
abusive/retaliatory discharge. New Jersey, by virtue of
Pierce, allows recovery under either theory.
In "Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee
Who Blows the Whistle" (1977 Wisc. L. Rev. 777), the
author divided the cases which have developed the public
policy exception to at-will terminations into three categories, each dependent upon the source of the determinant
of public policy. In the first category are the cases where a
statute gives a right to a discharged employee but no
remedy, in which case an implied remedy must to sought.
Category two involves a statutory expression of public
policy but provides for no right or remedy, in which case
both must be implied. Finally, there may be no (or only
remotely connected) legislation relative to the public
policy at issue. In this last instance, the judiciary must
define the public policy and then imply the right and
remedy. Presumably in this last area only progressive
courts will deign to not defer to the legislature.
Typical of the first category are the cases involving
individuals tho were discharged for filing workmen's
compensation claims. The oft-cited Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co.,260 Ind 249, was such a case. There an
employee was discharged one month after she had filed
her claim. The court decided the case on the pleadings
and held there to be a tort cause of action for retaliatory
discharge where the employer's action was taken in
response to the exercise of a statutory right. Arguably,
any statute which imposed a ,duty upon an individual
would be equivalent to a statute providing a right.
Therefore, any cases alleging retaliation for fulfilling a
statutory duty would lie in this category.
Petermann represents a sample of the second category.
The rationale of Petermann was reiterated by the Califor-
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nia Supreme Court in a recent case which also falls in this
category, Taneny v. Atlantic Richfield Co, 164 Cal Rptr
839 (1980). The plaintiff alleged that he had been fired
solely on account of his refusal to participate in a pricefixing scheme, an activity which is a criminal offense in
California. The court held that:
An employer's authority over its employee
does not include the right to demand that the
employee commit a criminal act to further its
interests, and an employer may not coerce
compliance with such unlawful directions by
discharging an employee who refuses to follow
such an order.
The court further held that such an employee has a cause
of action in tort against such an employer since the
employer would violate "a basic duty imposed by law on
all employers." Recovery, the court added, could include
both compensatory and punitive damages
In terms of jurisprudence, there is perhaps a more
important case falling in the second category. In Harless v.
First National Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270
(W.Va.,1978) a long-time bank employee discovered
violations of1 the federal and state consumer protection
lawns and went to surieriors, members of the board of
directors, and auditors in an attempt to persuade the
bank, his employer, to comply with the law. The bank's
response was to fire him. The West Virginia Supreme
Court held that the employee had a tort cause of action for
wrongful discharge since it found the discharge to contravene a "substantial public policy principle." After a
detailed analysis of the State's Consumer Credit Protection Act, the court found a "clear and unequivocal public
policy that consumers of credit covered by the Act were to
be given protection" and that the courts could not frustrate this intent by giving no protection to an individual like
Harless.
Since it is unlikely that legislation expressly giving private sector whistle blowers rights and remedies will be
adopted, cases falling in the third category are perhaps the
most important to professional at-will employees. Up
until Pierce, the two leading cases in this category were
Monge i,.
Beebe Rubber Co, 114 N.H. 130(1974), and Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96 (1974).
Interestingly, both cases provided discharged employees
protection under implied contract theories.
Monge involved sexual harrassment of an hourly
employee. The New Hampshire Supreme Court led into
its brief precedent-setting ruling by recounting the,'actual
allegations in some detail knd noted its own readiness to
ovefturn long-standing common law rules as it had done
in landlord-tenant relations. It then noted that "the law
governing the relations between erployer and employee
has similarly evolved over the years to reflect changing
legal, social and economic conditions." With this preparation, the court'announced:
We hold that a termination by the employer of
a contract of employnent at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic
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system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of employment contract.
The sole authority cited was Frampton, without explanation. Monge, therefore, supplies a broad basis on which a
contract action (which has the disadvantage as compared
to torts of having limited remedies), at least, may be premised on a public policy exception; arguably, where the
public interest involved exceeds the interest of the
employer in being able to discharge an individual for any
reason, under Monge the discharged individual would
have a cause of action.
The salesman with 25 years experience with his
employer in Fortune alleged that he was fired in an
attempt to deprive him of a substantial bonus. Finding in
the principles of the law of agency prohibitions against a
principal depriving his servant an agreed-to compensation
and against overreaching, the court held that the at-will
employment contract at issue (and, by inference from dicta, all employment contracts) contained "an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination
not made in good faith constitutes a breach of the contract". Therefore, as in Monge, arguably, any indication of
public policy support may give rise to a breach of contract
action in the retaliatory/abusive discharge situation.
Finally, under Pierce a discharged employee must be
able to demonstrate that his/her termination was contrary
to a clear mandate of public policy. Legislation and
judicial decisions present the sfrongest indicia that the
standard has been met. Professional codes of ethics may
express the clear mandate, but they fail to do so where
they are "designed to serve only the interests of a profession". The looseness of this standard is demonstrated by
Pierce decision itself in that Dr. Pierce's reliance on the
Hippocratic
Oath was found not to prohibit the specific,
"controversial
but not unlawful," research at issue. Nonetheless, Piercedoes provide a foundation upon which the
judiciary of States not yet embracing the public policy
exception may formulate their own protections of the
public interest.
New York is one state which, although tempted, has
refrained from adopting the wrongful discharge cause of
action. The temptation was acknowledged in a lower court
opinion in 1978 in which the court looked for a claim premised on-public policy demonstrated in constitutional,
statutory or decisional law, noting the great inertia working against adopting new causes of action, ('hll
r. AT&T
Co., 96 Misc.2d 1070 (1978), aff'd, w/o op. 70 A.D.2d
791 (1st Dept. 1979). The facts and argument before the
court were found to be unsatisfactory for that standard.
A federal court prodded New York to carve out the
public policy exception in Savodink v. Korivettes, Ic., 488
F Supp 822 (EDNY, 1980). There a discharged employee
who had been a participant in the company retirement
plan, subject to regulation by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, complained that his discharge
after thirteen years of service was based solely on an
attempt to avoid the vesting of his pension rights. Judge
Platt concluded New York would adopt the new cause of
(Continued oil pa-e 18)
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